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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TENTH AMENDMENT-STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS
A LIMIT ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER-The United States Supreme
Court held that a federal statute offering the states an option be-
tween two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory tech-
niques-either accepting ownership of radioactive waste generated
within the state or regulating radioactive waste disposal according
to Congress' direction-was beyond Congress' enumerated powers
and infringed upon state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment.
New York v United States, US , 112 S Ct 2408 (1992).
Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 19851 ("LLRWPAA") in response to an antici-
pated shortage of low-level radioactive waste sites among the
states.2 The LLRWPAA declared a federal policy of holding each
state responsible for providing for the disposal of all low-level radi-
oactive waste generated within its borders.' It also authorized
states to enter into regional interstate compacts, if desired, to pro-
vide for regional disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste.4 The
LLRWPAA provided three incentives to influence states to comply
with the declared federal policy of providing for the necessary ca-
pacity to dispose of radioactive waste.5
The first provision, establishing the monetary incentives, de-
clared that during a seven-year transition period: (1) states with
radioactive disposal sites were authorized to charge a surcharge on
1. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 USC §§ 2021b-
2021j (1985).
2. New York v United States, US , 112 S Ct 2408, 2415 (1992).
3. New York, 112 S Ct at 2415. The LLRWPAA provides, in pertinent part, that:
"[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation with other
States, for the disposal of ... low-level radioactive waste generated within the State." 42
USC § 2021c(a)(1)(A).
4. New York, 112 S Ct at 2415. The LLRWPAA provides: "[tlo carry out the policy
set forth ... the States may enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for
the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive
waste." 42 USC § 2021d(a)(2).
5. New York, 112 S Ct at 2416.
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all radioactive waste received from other states;6 (2) one-fourth of
all such surcharges accumulated were to be collected by the Secre-
tary of Energy who was then to place the funds collected in an
escrow account;' and (3) states meeting goals enumerated by the
LLRWPAA by certain deadline dates received payments from the
escrow account with such payments to be used for the purpose of
assuring the safe disposal of radioactive waste.8
The second provision, creating an access incentive, authorized
that following the seven-year transition ,period, states with disposal
sites could: (1) incrementally increase the cost of access to their
sites for radioactive waste arriving from states not meeting the
deadlines of the LLRWPAA; and (2) eventually deny access to
their sites altogether to waste arriving from such states.'
The third provision-the take-title incentive-provided that
each state producing radioactive waste and unable to provide for
disposal of all such waste by a deadline date must, upon the re-
quest of the actual entity generating or owning such waste, either:
(1) take title to and possession of the waste; or otherwise (2) be
6. 42 USC § 2021e(d)(1) provides:
The disposal of any low-level radioactive waste under this section (other than low-level radi-
oactive waste generated in a sited compact region) may be charged a surcharge by the State
in which the applicable regional disposal facility is located.
42 USC § 2021e(d)(1).
7. 42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(A) provides: "Twenty-five per centum of all surcharge fees
received by a State pursuant to [42 USC § 2021 e(d)(1)] .. .shall be transferred on a
monthly basis to an escrow account held by the Secretary." 42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(A).
8. 42 USC H8 2021e(d)(1)-(2) provides: "The twenty-five per centum of any amount
collected by a State under [42 USC § 2021e(d)(1)] . .. and transferred to the Secretary
under [42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(A)], shall be paid by the Secretary ...if the milestone de-
scribed . . . is met by the State in which such waste originated." 42 USC §
2021e(d)(2)(B)(i).
Any amount paid under [42 USC § 2012e(d)(2)(B)] ...may only be used to-
(I) establish low-level radioactive waste disposalfacilities;
(II) mitigate the impact of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities on the host
State;
(III) regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities; or
(IV) ensure the decommissioning, closure, and care. . of low-level radioactive waste
disposal facilities.
42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(E)(i).
9. 42 USC § 2021e(e)(2)(A) provides:
If any State falls to comply...
(i) any generator of low-level radioactive waste within such region or non-mem-
ber State shall ... be charged 2 times the surcharge otherwise applicable
under [42 USC § 2021e(d)] of this section; and
(ii) on or after January 1, 1987, any low-level radioactive waste generated
within such region or non-member State may be denied access to the regional
disposal facilities. . ..
42 USC § 2021e(e)(2)(A).
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liable for all damages incurred by the entity generating or. owning
the waste resulting from the state's failure to take title.10
In 1990, the State of New York and two of its counties ("New
York") brought suit against the United States seeking a declara-
tory judgment that, inter alia, held all three incentive provisions of
the LLRWPAA unconstitutional as being inconsistent with the
Tenth Amendment11 to the Constitution."2 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the
complaint.13 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed."' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.1 5 Before the Supreme Court, New York con-
tended that the Tenth Amendment limited the power of Congress
to regulate as it had in the LLRWPAA, and that rather than regu-
lating the generators, owners and disposers of radioactive waste di-
rectly, which would be well within Congress' power, Congress ex-
ceeded its power by directing the states to regulate in this area. 6
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 7 Jus-
10. 42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(C) provides:
If a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level radioactive
waste is generated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste generated
within such State or compact by January 1, 1996, each State in which such waste is
generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take title to
the waste, be obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all
damages directly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure
of the State to take possession of the waste as soon after January 1, 1996, as the
generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available for shipment.
42 USC § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
11. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." US Const, Amend X.
12. New York, 112 S Ct at 2417.
13. New York v United States, 757 F Supp 10, 13 (ND NY 1990), aff'd, 942 F2d 114
(2d Cir 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S Ct 2408 (1992). The district court held that
Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985), and South Car-
olina v Baker, 485 US 505 (1988), essentially foreclosed the courts from interdicting in the
exercise of federal power over the states unless there was a breakdown in the political pro-
cess which protects the states from federal power. New York, 757 F Supp at 12. The district
court found no such breakdown in this case. Id at 12-13.
14. New York v United States, 942 F2d 114, 121 (2d Cir 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 112 S Ct 2408 (1992). The court of appeals affirmed on the same grounds as given by
the district court. New York, 942 F2d at 120-21.
15. New York v United States, 112 S Ct 856 (1992).
16. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420.
17. Id at 2414. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, and joined in part by
Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. The Court affirmed the court of appeals decision
insofar as it held the monetary incentive and access incentive provisions of the LLRWPAA
constitutional. Id at 2427, 2435. It reversed the court of appeals decision insofar as it held
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tice O'Connor, writing for the majority, began her analysis of the
constitutional claim by noting that the Tenth Amendment re-
strained Congress' conferred powers, but that this restriction "is
not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which
• ..is essentially a tautology." 18 The Court settled that the Tenth
Amendment merely confirmed that Congress' power was subject to
restrictions that may reserve power to the states.'9 The proper in-
quiry, therefore, was deemed to be whether the state's sovereignty
was protected by a restriction on Congress' enumerated Article I
powers sought to be exercised here: the Commerce Power or the
Spending Power. 0
The Court next summarized three provisions of the Constitution,
important to the required examination, which conferred power on
the federal government. First, the Court reviewed Congress' Com-
merce Clause Power conferred by the Constitution2 noting that its
scope had expanded significantly over 200 years so that, today, ac-
tivities at one time considered purely local were well within Con-
gress' power to regulate interstate commerce.22 Second, Congress'
that the take-title incentive provision was constitutional. Id at 2429, 2435. Justice White
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined. Id at 2414. Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. Jus-
tice White's opinion concurred with the Court that the monetary incentive and access incen-
tive provisions were constitutional. Id at 2435 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Both Justices White and Stevens dissented with respect to that part of the Court's decision
which held the take-title incentive provision unconstitutional. Id at 2435, 2446-47 (Stevens
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. Id at 2418. Justice O'Connor also stated:
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment ex-
pressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attri-
bute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power
the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. It is in this sense that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered."
Id at 2417-18 (citations omitted).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Article I confers upon the Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among
the several States .. " US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
22. New York, 112 S Ct at 2419. "The scope of the power the commerce clause dele-
gates to Congress was first suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden. ...
Marshall indicated that, in his view, congressional power to regulate 'commercial inter-
course' extended to all activity having any interstate impact--however indirect." Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-4 at 306 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988). Thus,
even though the federal government was designed as one of enumerated powers and, there-
fore, limited powers, virtually from the beginning the commerce powers were broadly inter-
preted. This broad interpretation was adhered to until 1887 when the Court adopted a for-
malistic approach. (See note 97 and accompanying text). In 1937 the Court abandoned the
formal approach, and returned to Marshall's broad interpretation when it held in NLRB v
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constitutionally conferred power to Tax and Spend 23 was examined
and the Court recognized that Congress had the ability to set
terms upon which it would disburse federal funds to the states.2'
Finally, it was noted that, through the Supremacy Clause,25 Con-
gress may preempt state regulation by regulating in a particular
field within the confines of the Constitution.26
Justice O'Connor then reviewed the Court's most recent cases
involving the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, distinguish-
ing between two separate lines of cases: those involving "generally
applicable laws," and those in which Congress attempted to "direct
or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or
in a particular way."'2 7 The Court cited National League of Cities v
Usery,28 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,29
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937), that Congress could regulate labor relations
at any manufacturing plant because work stoppage would affect interstate commerce. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US at 41, 43. Tribe summarized the effect of the Court's inter-
pretation: "[a]n activity which takes place wholly intrastate may now be subject to congres-
sional regulation entirely because of the activity's impact in other states." Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 5-4 at 309. The Court's interpretation was further broadened in 1942
when it adopted an aggregate effect interpretation in Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942),
which held that Congress could control a single farmer's production of wheat for home use
because, if all farmers were considered, in the aggregate the amount of wheat grown for
personal use could rationally be thought to effect interstate commerce by altering supply
and demand. Wickard, 317 US at 127-28. Thus, Congress has been held to have the power
to regulate not only activities that have an effect on interstate commerce, but also activities
of individuals if the class of such activities, in the aggregate, could rationally be thought of
as affecting interstate commerce. Today it is recognized that Congress' commerce power is
limited only by external restrictions such as the Bill of Rights and, to some extent, political
restraints of the federal system. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-7 at 313-14. See
also note 103 and accompanying text.
23. Article I of the Constitution states that: "Congress shall have Power to lay and
collect Taxes, . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United
States." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 1.
24. New York, 112 S Ct at 2419. For example, the Court noted that the Spending
Power permits Congress to stipulate the disbursement of highway funds upon the state's
sanction of a certain minimum drinking age. Id.
25. Article VI of the Constitution provides that: "the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." US Const, Art VI, § 2.
26. New York, 112 S Ct at 2419.
27. Id at 2420.
28. 426 US 833 (1976), rev'd, 469 US 528, 531 (1985).
29. 469 US 528 (1985). The Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which regulated minimum wage and maximum hour obligations of private and public
employers to a municipally owned and operated mass transit system. Garcia, 469 US at 533.
Garcia expressly overruled National League of Cities. Garcia, 469 US at 531. The Court
held that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in
all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through state par-
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and Gregory v Ashcroft30 as cases where Congress subjected the
states to generally applicable laws.31 The Court held that the in-
stant case was "not a case in which Congress has subjected a State
to the same legislation applicable to private parties," and there-
fore, did not require the Court to apply or to review the holdings
of any of the cases involving such generally applicable laws. 2 It
was held, instead, that this case was of the line in which Congress
directed or influenced the states to regulate."3
The Court then reviewed two Tenth Amendment cases from the
"directing or motivating States to regulate" line: Hodel v Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc.34 and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v Mississippi. 5 Quoting Hodel, the Court
set forth the premise that "Congress may not simply 'com-
mandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly com-
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'
The Supreme Court found that a similar conclusion was reached in
FERC in which the Court "observed that 'this Court never has
sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promul-
gate and enforce laws and regulations.' "31 Justice O'Connor then
delved into the history of the Constitutional Congress indicating
that the "[f]ramers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.
3 8
The Court then explored two of the methods by which Congress
may encourage states to regulate in accordance with Congress'
desires. First, Congress can, under its Taxing and Spending Power,
set terms upon the receipt of federal funds, however, "[s]uch funds
must (among other requirements) bear some relationship to the
ticipation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that un-
duly burden the States will not be promulgated." Id at 556.
30. 111 S Ct 2395 (1991).
31. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 452 US 264 (1981). Hodel upheld the constitutionality of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 which preempted state regulation in the field of sur-
face mining except when a state adopted the federal regulation. Hodel, 452 US at 268.
35. 456 US 742 (1982). Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v Mississippi
("FERC") upheld the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 ("PURPA") which re-
quired state agencies regulating utilities to give consideration to twelve proposed rate
schemes and provide federally prescribed feedback comments. FERC, 456 US at 745.
PURPA was upheld because there was "nothing in PURPA directly compelling the States
to enact a legislative program." Id at 765.
36. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420 quoting Hodel, 452 US at 288.
37. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420 quoting FERC, 456 US at 761-62.
38. New York, 112 S Ct at 2423.
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purpose of the federal spending.""9 The Court stated that it is not
unusual that the terms conditioning receipt of such funds influence
a state's legislature.4
Second, the Court noted that where Congress has the power to
regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the
ability to influence state legislatures by offering the states the
choice of either regulating that activity in accordance with federal
standards or, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, having the state's
law preempted by federal regulation of the activity."' The Court
reasoned that with either of these constitutionally acceptable
methods, Congress could ultimately achieve its goal to encourage
states to comply with a federal standard, and at the same time,
leave accountability with the entity enforcing the federal standard
upon the state's residents."2
Using these principles, the Court analyzed the three challenged
LLRWPAA provisions. Both the monetary incentive and access in-
centive were found to be consistent with the Tenth Amendment,
and therefore, constitutional. 3 Initially, the Court examined the
three steps of the monetary incentive, the first step being the au-
thorization to states having disposal sites to impose a surcharge for
waste arriving from non-sited states." This was found to be a valid
exercise of Congress' power to authorize states to burden interstate
commerce. 45 The second step, concerning the Secretary of Energy's
collection of one-fourth of the surcharge, was found to be no more
than a valid federal tax on interstate commerce. 4" The third step,
involving the disbursement of funds from the escrow account to
states meeting the LLRWPAA enumerated goals, was found not to
39. Id. The Court cited South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203 (1987), which upheld a
federal statute that withheld federal highway funds from any state which had a minimum
drinking age of less than 21 years. South Dakota, 483 US at 206.
40. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420.
41. Id at 2424 citing Hodel, 452 US at 288, and FERC, 456 US at 764-65.
42. New York, 112 S Ct at 2424. The Court reasoned that should the state legislature
choose to comply with the federal standards, then the citizens would hold the state officials
accountable. Id. If the state legislature had chosen not to comply and the federal govern-
ment stepped in to regulate, then the citizens would hold the federal officials accountable.
Id. The Court pointed out that were Congress to direct state legislatures to regulate, instead
of offering a choice, the accountability of state and federal officials would be lessened. Id.
43. Id at 2427.
44. Id at 2415.
45. Id at 2426. The Court cited Wyoming v Oklahoma, 112 S Ct 789 (1992), which
held that the Negative Commerce Clause limit on States' power to burden interstate com-
merce can be lifted by Congress' expression of an "unambiguous intent." Wyoming, 112 S
Ct at 802.
46. New York, 112 S Ct at 2426.
1993
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exceed Congress' Spending Power authority to condition receipt of
federal funds. 7 This was because, inter alia, the conditions im-
posed were related to the purpose of the federal spending.'" The
Court held that since all three steps of the monetary incentive
were within Congress' Article I Commerce Clause and Taxing and
Spending Clause Powers, the incentive was not inconsistent with
the Tenth Amendment.' 9
Second, the Court analyzed the access incentive which author-
ized states having disposal sites to, eventually, deny access to their
sites to waste arriving from states not regulating in accordance
with the federal guidelines.50 This presented the non-sited states
with the option of either regulating in accordance with the federal
standards or not so regulating and having state regulation pre-
empted by federal regulation.51 Federal preemption in this case
would take the form of state residents, producing or owning waste,
being subject to the federal regulation authorizing sited states to
deny them access.52 The Court held that since the regulation of the
activity was within the scope of Congress' Commerce Clause
Power, the access incentive was a valid conditional use of Congress'
Commerce Clause Power, and therefore, was not inconsistent with
the Tenth Amendment.
5 3
The take-title incentive of the LLRWPAA, however, was found
by the Court to be outside Congress' enumerated powers and in-
consistent with the Tenth Amendment.5' The. take-title incentive
offered states the choice of either: (1) taking title to or being held
liable for radioactive waste generated within its boundaries; or (2)
regulating in accordance with the LLRWPAA.5 5 The Court held
that, with respect to the first alternative standing alone, the Con-
stitution would neither permit Congress to transfer title to radioac-
tive waste from its owner to state governments nor would it permit
Congress to declare that states would become liable for the waste
47. Id at 2426-27.
48. Id.




53. Id. The Court stated the where federal regulation of private activity was within
the scope of the Commerce Clause, it had recognized the ability of Congress to offer states
the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation. Id citing Hodel, 452 US at 288; and FERC, 456 US at 764-65.
54. New York, 112 S Ct at 2429.




owner's damages by refusing to take title.56 Either federal action,
said the Court, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes, and would ... be inconsis-
tent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal
and state governments." 57
Likewise, the Court found that the second alternative, regulating
in accordance with the LLRWPAA, standing alone, constituted a
"command to state governments to implement legislation enacted
by Congress. . . . [T]he Constitution does not empower Congress
to subject state governments to this type of instruction. ' 58 Be-
cause, the Court reasoned, either alternative, standing alone, would
be beyond Congress' power, it is also beyond Congress' power to
offer the states a choice between the two. 9 This dilemma was sum-
marized in the Court's statement: "[a] State may not decline to
administer the federal program. No matter which path the State
chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress."0
Because the provision offered the states a choice between two
unconstitutionally coercive alternatives, the provision directly
compelled the states to enact federal regulation. This was "an out-
come," the Court stated, "that has never been understood to lie
within the authority conferred upon the Congress by the Constitu-
tion."61 Thus, the Court held that because the take-title provision
was beyond Congress' constitutionally conferred authority,62 the
provision was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment, and there-
fore, was not constitutional.6 s
In a dissenting opinion, 4 Justice White argued, with respect to
the Tenth Amendment issue, that the Court's analysis was flawed
since it: (1) built its argument on the unsupportable distinction be-
tween generally applicable laws and laws directing states to regu-
late; (2) derived its rule of law from precedent not supporting its
analysis; (3) failed to apply the test found in the cases on which it
based its rule; and (4) failed to apply the most recent and appro-




60. Id at 2429.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id at 2435.
64. Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens. Id (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1993 885
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priate test." The dissent stated that the Court's distinction be-
tween federal statutes which regulate states and private parties
alike (generally applicable laws), and those which regulate only
"the activities of States," was not supported by the Court's recent
Tenth Amendment decisions since, in no case, had the Court based
a decision on that distinction.6 The dissent maintained that such
a distinction was irrelevant in an analysis of Congressional power
relative to the Tenth Amendment since "[a]n incursion on state
sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the
federal statute that 'commands' specific action also applies to pri-
vate parties."67
Justice White next argued that the Court's premise that Con-
gress may not commandeer state legislatures was not supported by
either Hodel or FERC.e5 The dissent pointed out that the Court's
rule in Hodel was drawn from a statement in dictum69 not neces-
sary to its holding.70 Likewise, the dissent also discounted the
Court's rule extracted from FERC,71 by maintaining that the full
quotation as it appeared in FERC7 2 meant merely that the Court
had not yet had the opportunity to decide whether the federal gov-
ernment may command the states to enact legislation.73 Justice
White concluded that since neither case expressly held that Con-
gress may not direct states to legislate, and since both cases actu-
65. Id at 2441 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. Id. The recent decisions Justice White cited were: Gregory v Ashcroft, 111 S Ct
2395 (1991); South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505 (1988); Garcia v San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985); EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226 (1983); and Na-
tional League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976).
67. New York, 112 S Ct at 2441 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part). Jus-
tice White also stated that: "[t]he alleged diminution in state authority over its own affairs
is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the activities of private parties." Id.
68. Id at 2443.
69. The statement referred to reads: "[t]hus, there can be no suggestion that the Act
commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program." Hodel, 452 US at 288.
70. New York, 112 S Ct at 2442 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. The Court had, in its opinion, stated: "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly
a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations." New
York, 112 S Ct at 2420 quoting FERC, 456 US at 761-62.
72. Id at 2442. Justice White stated:
[Tihe passage reads: "While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal com-
mand to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, there are in-
stances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect di-
rected state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions."
Id at 2442 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original) quoting FERC, 456 US at 761-62.
73. New York, 112 S Ct at 2442 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ally upheld federal regulation that directed states to undertake
certain actions,7 4 he remained "unconvinced that either Hodel or
FERC supported the rule announced by the Court.
'7 5
The dissent's third argument asserted that if the cases cited by
the Court did stand for the rule that Congress may not direct the
states to regulate, then it would be proper to apply the test set
forth in FERC which "was to assess whether the alleged intrusion
on the state sovereignty 'do[es] not threaten the State's separate
and independent existence' and do[es] not impair the ability of the
States 'to function effectively in a federal system.' ",76 Justice
White stated that neither prong of the FERC test raised a consti-
tutional problem in the instant case, and that therefore, even ap-
plying the decisions selectively chosen by the Court, the Court's
analysis of the take-title provision failed."
The dissent then proposed that, even if the instant case did not
involve a generally applicable law, the proper analysis of the take-
title provision was that of Garcia in which the Court held that the
political process itself restrained Congress' Commerce Clause pow-
ers.7 8 Justice White, having previously discussed at length the in-
volvement of state leaders as proponents of the LLRWPAA,7 9 im-
plied that since New York was involved in, and was a proponent
of, the passage of the LLRWPAA at both the gubernatorial and
federal representative levels, the political process was at work, and
thus, restrained this exercise of Commerce Clause power to the ex-
tent necessary to preserve state sovereignty.80 He concluded by
stating his disagreement with the majority's holding that the take-
title provision was unconstitutional.t
In a separate opinion,82 Justice Stevens maintained that the con-
74. See notes 34, 35 and accompanying text.
75. New York, 112 S Ct at 2443 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
76. Id (citations omitted) quoting FERC, 456 US at 765-66.
77. New York, 112 S Ct at 2443 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
78. Id. Justice White quoted the following passage from Garcia:
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme
imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process
rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce
Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limita-
tion, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national politi-
cal process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'
New York, 112 S Ct at 2443-44 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part) quoting Gar-
cia, 469 US at 554. See note 29 and accompanying text.
79. New York, 112 S Ct at 2435-38 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
80. Id at 2444.
81. Id at 2445.
82. Justice Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id at 2446 (Stevens
1993
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cept that Congress did not have the power to command states to
execute legislation enacted by Congress was false.83 Also, the Tenth
Amendment "surely does not impose any limit on Congress' exer-
cise of the powers delegated to it by Article 1.' " Justice Stevens
pointed out that the federal government directed states in many
areas, as evidenced by its regulation of state-operated railroads,
school systems, prisons and elections.83 Therefore, there was no
reason why Congress could not also command states to enforce
federal standards for the disposal of radioactive waste.86
In order to fully comprehend the New York decision, an exami-
nation of the Constitution and prior Supreme Court Tenth
Amendment decisions is essential. The Tenth Amendment was
modeled after Article II of the Articles of Confederation which re-
served to the states "every power. . . which is not by this Confed-
eration expressly delegated to the United States . ",87 This res-
ervation of power was not included in the Constitution originally,
nor was its language carried over four years later into the Tenth
Amendment where the word "expressly" was omitted from the
Tenth Amendment.8 The intent of the Framers is reflected in
Federalist 44, in which Madison stated that had the language of
Article II of the Articles of Confederation been adopted "Congress
would be continually exposed, as their predecessors [had] been, to
the alternative of construing the term 'expressly' with so much
rigor, as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever,
or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force. of the
restriction."
89
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Id. Justice Stevens stated that there was nothing in the Constitution nor in its
history that restrained Congress from commanding states to enact legislation. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id at 2447.
87. Article II of the Articles of Confederation provides:
Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, ju-
risdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States in Congress assembled.
Art Confed, Art II.
88. See note 11 for the text of the Tenth Amendment.
89. Federalist 44 (Madison) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 299, 303 (Wes-
leyan Univ Press, 1961)(emphasis in original). Madison went on to say:
As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government
which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of
betraying the public interest by doing nothing; or of violating the Constitution by




The omission of one word in translating Article II of the Articles
of Confederation into the Tenth Amendment was seized upon
twenty-eight years later by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v
Maryland,90 striking the first judicial blow to the Tenth Amend-
ment. McCulloch presented the question of whether Congress,
under its Article I enumerated powers, had the authority to incor-
porate a bank.9 The Court held that the act incorporating the
bank was constitutional.9 2 With respect to the Tenth Amendment,
the Court noted that there is no language in the Constitution
"which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or
implied powers.""s The Court found that since the framers of the
Tenth Amendment omitted the word "expressly," they meant to
avoid the difficulties which resulted from its inclusion in the Arti-
cles of Confederation,"' namely, the construction of the term so
that the government was left without any real powers, save those
few expressly granted in Article I, narrowly construed. 5
This interpretation of the Tenth Amendment continued for
ninety-nine years until a brief resurgence during the "laissez faire"
era9 6 of the first part of this century. In 1918, the Court, in Ham-
mer v Dagenharte7 called the Tenth Amendment back into service
to help justify a limit to the Commerce Clause power of the Con-
gress. The issue raised in Dagenhart was whether Congress could
use its power to regulate interstate commerce to prohibit the trans-
portation of manufactured goods in interstate commerce.9 " The
factories producing such goods employed children below a certain
age. 9 The Court determined that the objective of the federal act
Federalist 44 (Madison) in Cooke, ed, The Federalist at 303-04 (emphasis in original).
90. 17 US (1 Wheat) 316 (1819).
91. McCulloch, 17 US at 401.
92. Id at 423.
93. Id at 406.
94. Id at 406-07.
95. See note 89 and accompanying text.
96. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-4 at 307-08 (cited in note 22). From
1887 to 1937 the Court adhered to a doctrine of narrow formalism which restricted congres-
sional power. Id. By way of illustration, prior to 1887 the Court followed Marshall's princi-
ple that "congressional power to regulate [interstate commerce] extended to all activity hav-
ing any interstate impact-however indirect." Id at 306. Thereafter, and up to 1937, the
Court substituted a formal characterization of economic activity in determining what was
interstate commerce. "This half-century is usually remembered as one in which the Court
repeatedly struck down congressional action as unauthorized under the commerce clause."
Id at 307.
97. 247 US 251 (1918), rev'd, United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 117 (1941).
98. Dagenhart, 247 US at 269.
99. Id. The act in question provided, in pertinent part, that:
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was to standardize the ages at which children could be employed
within the states, and reasoned that the constitutional grant of
power to regulate interstate commerce was not "intended to de-
stroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the
States in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution." 100 There-
fore, it was held that such regulation was "repugnant to the Con-
stitution" and not within Congress' Commerce Clause power.10 1 In
support of its conclusion, the Court paraphrased the Tenth
Amendment stating: "[i]n interpreting the Constitution it must
never be forgotten that . . . to [the states] and to the people the
powers not expressly delegated to the national government are
reserved." 102
The Court's reversion to the Articles of Confederation language
in interpreting the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on Congress'
Article I powers may have been anomalous, and at any rate was
dashed in the "New Deal" era'0s when, in 1941, the Court over-
ruled Dagenhart in United States v Darby.104 The issue before the
Court in Darby was similar to that in Dagenhart: whether Con-
gress, via the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), could: (1) pro-
hibit from interstate commerce the shipment of goods manufac-
tured by employees earning less than a prescribed minimum wage;
and (2) prohibit the employment of workers engaged in the manu-
facture of goods for interstate commerce at less than the minimum
wage standard.108 The FLSA was challenged as a violation of the
[N]o producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for shipment in interstate
or foreign commerce . . . any article or commodity the product of any . . . factory
• . . situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior to the removal of
such products therefrom children under the age of fourteen years have been em-
ployed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen years and six-
teen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any
day, or more than six days in any week..
Act of Sept 1, 1916, 39 Stat 675 (1916).
100. Dagenhart, 247 US at 273-74.
101. Id at 276.
102. Id at 275 (emphasis added).
103. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-22 at 386 (cited in note 22). As Tribe
stated with respect to this era:
In the years after 1937, the Supreme Court essentially offered the Congress carte
blanche to regulate the economic and social life of the nation, its actions subject only
to the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights alone operated as trump
cards over those exercises of congressional power affirmatively authorized by the Con-
stitution. States' rights, in contrast, were not an override; they were a residue.
Id.
104. 312 US 100 (1941).
105. Darby, 312 US at 108.
Vol. 31:877
Recent Decisions
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.0 6 The Court, in
holding that the FLSA was within Congress' authority, stated that
the Tenth Amendment did not affect its decision because the
Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered," and went on to -state that "[t]here is
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more
than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments."'' 7 Thus, whatever restraint, if any, the Tenth
Amendment may have imposed on Congress' powers, the limits
were not secured in its language since the text of the Tenth
Amendment merely confirms that all that is not conferred upon
Congress belongs to the states.
The recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment trace
within a shorter time frame an even more turbulent path. In 1968,
the FLSA was again before the Supreme Court in Maryland v
Wirtz.' In a 1966 amendment to the FLSA, the scope of the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions was expanded to em-
ployees of schools and hospitals, including state owned schools and
hospitals.0 " Thus, as opposed to previous Tenth Amendment
cases, a federal statute proposed to regulate not only private enter-
prises, but also those run by the states. Maryland challenged the
statute insofar as it applied to state employees, as an interference
with the sovereignty of states.1' 0 However, the Court upheld the
FLSA as valid under the Commerce Clause and not invalid as in-
terfering with state sovereignty."1 The Court found the applica-
tion of the FLSA to hospitals and schools was a valid exercise of
the power to regulate interstate commerce."' Moreover, where a
"State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated
by the Federal government when engaged in by private persons,
the State too may be forced to conform.""'  Although the Wirtz
Court did not address the Tenth Amendment issue directly, it did
106. Id at 111.
107. Id at 124. The Court said additionally: "From the beginning and for many years
the amendment has been construed as not depriving the national government of authority
to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power .. " Id.
108. 392 US 183 (1968), rev'd, National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833, 854-55
(1976).
109. Wirtz, 392 US at. 186-87.
110. Id at 193. "[T]he argument is made in terms of interference with 'sovereign state
functions.' " Id.
111. Id at 188.
112. Id at 192.
113. Id at 197.
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indicate that it was holding to the Darby interpretation of the
amendment when it stated that "the sovereign power of the states
is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to
the federal government in the Constitution." '114
In a dissenting opinion,1 5 however, Justice Douglas specifically
addressed the Tenth Amendment issue and found that the FLSA
disrupted state fiscal policy and threatened states' autonomy in
the regulation of the health care and education fields, and there-
fore, was an invasion of state sovereignty as protected by the
Tenth Amendment." 6
In 1976, the pendulum swung again when, in National League of
Cities v Usery,"7 the Court, 5 to 4, overturned Wirtz."" The case
involved the 1974 amendment to the FLSA which expanded the
minimum wage and maximum hour standards of the FLSA to vir-
tually all state employees. 1 9 The Court found the challenged pro-
visions unconstitutional,'2 ° and set forth the rule that an exercise
of Congress' Commerce Clause Power is unconstitutional whenever
it "operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions."'' In so holding, the National League of Cities Court was
the first to find that state sovereignty imposed a definite limit on
114. Id at 198.
115. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stewart joined. Id at
201 (Douglas dissenting).
116. Id at 201-03 (Douglas dissenting).
117. 426 US 833 (1976), rev'd, Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 US 528, 531 (1985).
118. National League of Cities, 426 US at 854-55.
119. Id at 836. The FLSA amendment also applied to employees of state political sub-
divisions. Id. Appellants, a variety of states and municipalities, challenged the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions and sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that the provisions " 'infringed a constitutional prohibition' running in favor of the
States as States." Id at 836-37.
120. Id at 852. The Court determined that the power to determine the wages to be
paid to state employees was an "undoubted attribute of State sovereignty." Id at 845. The
Court also held that the challenged minimum wage and maximum hour provisions would
"impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions" of the states and their
subdivisions, and therefore, were unconstitutional. Id at 851-52.
121. Id at 852. The Court in Hodel, 452 US at 287-88, stated that the test of whether
an exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause Power is unconstitutional under National
League of Cities was:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as
States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably
"attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
Id at 287-88 (citations omitted).
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Congress' commerce power."'
In 1981, the Court decided Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association,'2. the first of three divergent line of
Tenth Amendment cases preceding New York v United States, in
which Congress sought to influence or direct states alone, as op-
posed to previous Tenth Amendment cases where states and pri-
vate enterprises were both regulated. Hodel involved the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"), which
set forth federal standards for private coal mine operators. 124 Al-
though SMCRA is for the most part depictable as a generally ap-
plicable law, one of the challenged provisions gave states the op-
tion of either regulating surface coal mining operations in
accordance with the prescribed federal standards, 2 ' or having any
regulation of surface coal mining not in compliance with the fed-
eral standards preempted by federal regulation, 2 ' which is charac-
teristic of a law directing or influencing a state to legislate.
Virginia challenged SMCRA as unconstitutional contending that
SMCRA exceeded Congress' power as limited by National League
of Cities, and that the threat of federal preemption coerced the
states into legislating in accordance with SMCRA.'2 7 The Court
held that SMCRA was not invalid under either contention since:
(1) SMCRA did not regulate states as states as prohibited by Na-
tional League of Cities; and (2) SMCRA did not compel states to
regulate in accordance with federal standards since it left the
states with the choice of either implementing legislation that com-
plied with SMCRA itself or yielding to a federally administered
regulatory program.' 8
122. Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 Harv Envir L Rev 437,
467 (1987).
123. 452 US 264 (1981).
124. Hodel, 452 US at 268-69.
125. The Court summarized the pertinent portion of SMCRA:
Included among [the performance] standards are requirements governing: (a) restora-
tion of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its approxi-
mate original contour; (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization of
disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used
as dams and embankments; (f) revegitation of mined areas; and (g) spoil disposal.
Id at 269.
126. Id at 271-72.
127. Id at 289.
128. Id at 288. With respect to the rejection of the second contention the Court stated:
"[tihus, there can be no suggestion that [SMCRA] commandeers the legislative processes of




In 1982, a second Tenth Amendment case involving the federal
government directing the states to regulate came before the Su-
preme Court. FERC v Mississippi2 ' involved the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), which directed state
utility regulatory commissions to consider a series of federal rate
designs and regulatory standards, and to follow hearing and com-
ment procedures when evaluating those designs and standards."' 0
Mississippi challenged the PURPA provisions as an invasion of
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.' 3' After
determining that the regulation of utilities was a federally
preemptable field, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the challenged pro-
visions of PURPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment since
they did "not involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi's sover-
eign powers,"132 nor was there anything in the provisions " 'directly
compelling' the states to enact a legislative program."' 33 As in Ho-
del, the Court reasoned that since PURPA left to the states the
option of either continuing to regulate, but according to the federal
conditions, or simply abandoning the field of utility regulation,
"PURPA should not be invalid simply because . . . Congress
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed states to continue reg-
ulating" where it could have preempted the state outright.' The
Court did note, however, that the choice to not regulate would be a
difficult one for states since in FERC, unlike Hodel, Congress
failed to provide an alternative federal regulatory mechanism in
the event of state default."3 5
In a dissenting opinion,'36 Justice O'Connor found that the pro-
visions satisfied the National League of Cities test, and therefore,
would have found PURPA unconstitutional for that reason.'3 7 The
dissent went on to reject the Court's argument that Congress
adopted the less intrusive scheme by allowing the states to con-
tinue regulating on the condition they consider the federal stan-
dards, stating that federal preemption in this case would have been
129. 456 US 742 (1982).
130. FERC, 456 US at 746-49.
131. Id at 752.
132. Id at 765, 769.
133. Id at 765.
134. Id at 764-65.
135. Id at 766.
136. Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id at 775 (O'Connor concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
137. Id at 779-80.
Vol. 31:877
1993 Recent Decisions 895
preferable to the PURPA scheme in that it would be far less bur-
densome to the state governmental bodies. 138
The Court faced another Tenth Amendment challenge to a gen-
erally applicable law in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,'3" and reversed itself again.14 0 Garcia examined
the application of the FLSA minimum wage and maximum hour
standards to a municipally owned and operated mass transit sys-
tem. 41 In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, and joined by
the four dissenters of National League of Cities,"2 the Court over-
ruled National League of Cities, 5 to 4, on the grounds that the
"attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in
terms of 'traditional governmental function' was not only unwork-
able but was also inconsistent with established principles of feder-
alism."' 43 The Court did not, however, go on to set forth a new
standard by which the judiciary could determine limitations on
congressional power with respect to state sovereignty, but instead,
held that the political process, and not the judiciary, was responsi-
138. Id at 786-87.
139. 469 US 528 (1984).
140. Garcia, 469 US at 531.
141. Id at 533. The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ("SAMTA") had, up
until the National League of Cities decision in 1976, complied with the 1966 amendment to
the FLSA which extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour standards to all
schools, hospitals and mass-transit carriers, private and public, and which was held in Wirtz
to be constitutional. In 1976, SAMTA ceased compliance with the FLSA, however, in 1979,
the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA, as a municipally owned mass
transit carrier, was not immune from the FLSA under National League of Cities. SAMTA
sought a declaratory judgment in the district court that National League of Cities pre-
cluded application of the FLSA to SAMTA, in which action Garcia, a SAMTA employee,
intervened. The district court held twice (the second time was on remand from the Supreme
Court following direct appeal) that SAMTA was immune from the FLSA regulation pursu-
ant to National League of Cities. Garcia, 469 US at 534-36.
142. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens dissented in National League of
Cities, while Justice Blackmun conditionally concurred in that case on the understanding
that the Court's decision set forth a balancing test which would allow demonstrably greater
federal interest to trump interests of state sovereignty. National League of Cities, 426 US at
856 (Blackmun concurring). Thus, Justice Blackmun was the swing vote which allowed a 5-4
reversal of Wirtz in National League of Cities, and a 5-4 reversal of National League of
Cities in Garcia,
143. Garcia, 469 US at 531. The Court stated:
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in these and in other cases over
the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of
state regulatory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental function" is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, in-
deed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities pur-
ported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.
Garcia, 469 US at 531. Note, however, that the Court did not overrule either Hodel or
FERC.
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ble for protecting state sovereignty from federal encroachment.'"
The Court found that the political process provided built-in re-
straints through state participation in the federal system, and thus,
ensured that laws unduly burdening the states would not be
promulgated.' 4 5 Therefore, with respect to the challenged FLSA
provisions, the Court stated that since the provisions were a valid
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause Power to regulate private
and public activities alike, they were not violative of state
sovereignty. 4"
The dissent 47 strongly disapproved of the Court's decision be-
cause the announced rule "substantially altered the federal system
embodied in the Constitution," and because consideration by
elected officials participating in the federal system was insufficient
to protect state sovereignty since legislation is drafted not by rep-
resentatives, but by non-elected staff personnel.' The dissenters
maintained that it was the responsibility of the courts to interpret
the Constitution and determine the limits the Tenth Amendment
imposed on Congressional power.'49
South Dakota v Dole 50 was the most recent case prior to New
York in which the Court addressed a Tenth Amendment issue in-
volving federal direction to, or influencing of, states to legislate.
Dole involved a federal statute which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a portion of otherwise allocable federal
highway funds from states which had a drinking age of less than
21, s5 and thus, presented the states with a choice of either legislat-
ing to adopt the federally acceptable minimum drinking age, or not
so legislating and being denied a percentage of their federal high-
way funding.'52 Although the statute was not challenged as being
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment,' the Court did briefly
144. Garcia, 469 US at 552.
145. Id at 556. The Court's theory was that since states participate in the federal po-
litical process (through their citizens electing Senators, Representatives and the President)
the structure of the federal government itself protected the state's sovereignty. Id.
146. Id.
147. Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justices .Rehnquist and
O'Connor joined, dissented. Id at 557 (Powell dissenting).
148. Id at 557, 576.
149. Id at 570.
150. 483 US 203 (1987).
151. Dole, 483 US at 205.
152. Id at 205, 210-11.
153. South Dakota, which had a drinking age of 19, challenged the statute on the
grounds that: (1) it was beyond Congress' power to tax and spend; and (2) it violated the
Twenty-First Amendment's reservation to the states of the power to impose restrictions on
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address a perceived Tenth Amendment issue.1 4 The Court, in per-
tinent part, "recognized that in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to . . .
[turn] into compulsion."155 The Court found, however, that since
the percentage of federal funding that would be denied a state re-
fusing to comply with the minimum drinking age provision was rel-
atively small, the condition on the grant of federal funds did not
rise to the level of coercion, and therefore, was a valid use of the
Spending Power not in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
156
Finally, before the Court in South Carolina v Baker15 7 was the
first challenge of a generally applicable law since Garcia. Baker in-
volved a federal tax statute, applicable to both private entities and
states, which gave states and municipalities issuing bonds the op-
tion of either issuing bonds in registered form or having their
bonds subject to federal taxation.158 South Carolina challenged the
statute as unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment on the
grounds that it essentially required states to issue bonds in regis-
tered form, and that the political process had failed.169 The Court
held the statute constitutional and rejected the state's contention
that the political process failed since "South Carolina ha[d] not
even alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in the
national political process or that it was singled out in any way that
left it politically isolated and powerless."'16 Significantly, the Court
expressly distinguished between laws regulating state activi-
ties-generally applicable laws-and laws "seek[ing] to control or
influence the manner in which States regulate".'' With respect to
the later, the Court acknowledged that the rule suggested in FERC
the sale of liquor. Id at 205.
154. Id at 210.
155. Id at 211 (citations omitted).
156. Dole, 483 US at 211-12. The Court found that South Dakota, in choosing not to
comply, would be denied five percent of its federal highway funds. Id at 211.
157. 485 US 505 (1988).
158. Baker, 485 US at 510. The statute at issue was the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, 26 USC § 103(j) (1982), which repealed the exemption from federal
taxation of interest earned on state and municipal bonds unless such bonds were issued in
registered form. 26 USC § 1036)(I). Id at 507.
159. Baker, 485 US at 510-12.
160. Id at 512-13. Baker thus extended the Garcia rule in that it appeared to foreclose
judicial review of a Tenth Amendment challenge altogether unless a state alleged it has been
deprived of the right to participate in the political process or that it has been singled out
and politically isolated. Id. Therefore, unless a challenging state can show it was refused
access to the national political process, the Court will find the law was not in violation of the
Tenth Amendment.
161. Id at 514.
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"survive[d] Garcia or pose[d] constitutional limitations indepen-
dent of those discussed in Garcia.'6 2
Thus, in the recent history of Tenth Amendment cases, the
Court has developed two lines of cases, each apparently having its
own standards for determining whether a Congressional act is in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. In the Wirtz, National League
of Cities, Garcia, and Baker line of cases, at issue was a generally
applicable law regulating the activities of states and private enter-
prises alike. Under Garcia and Baker, the most recent rule with
respect to the Tenth Amendment is that the political process en-
sures that laws that interfere with state sovereignty will not be
promulgated,6 3 and that "judicially created limitations on federal
power" are not proper."' A Congressional act can only be success-
fully challenged under the Tenth Amendment by the state showing
that it was excluded from participating in the political process."6 5
In the Hodel, FERC, and Dole line of cases, at issue was a fed-
eral law which either directed or influenced states to legislate in
accordance with federal standards. The rule with respect to the
Tenth Amendment developed in those cases is that Congress may
not compel states to legislate. In each case, a Congressional act was
upheld because the laws always gave states the option of either
legislating in accordance with federal standards, or not so legislat-
ing and facing either federal preemption in the field 6 or a diminu-
tion of federal funding.1
6 7
Considering that Garcia did not overrule the Hodel line of cases
nor did it purport to make its rule applicable to instances where
Congressional acts sought to direct or compel states to legislate,
the Supreme Court's decision in New York with respect to the
162. Id at 513. The Court stated that it need not address to what extent FERC sur-
vived Garcia since the case before the Court involved a generally applicable law, not a law
which sought to control or influence the way in which states regulate. Baker, 485 US at 513-
14. Note that this acknowledgment was made in the majority opinion which was joined in by
Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens. Id at 507. These Justices, in their dissents in New
York, claimed that there was no distinction between the two types of laws and that, even if
there was, Garcia provided the proper rule of law. In fact, Justice White indicated in his
dissent that Baker was one of the Court's recent Tenth Amendment cases not supporting
such a distinction between the two types of laws. New York, 112 S Ct at 2441 (White con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). See note 66 and accompanying text.
163. Garcia, 469 US at 556.
164. Id at 552.
165. Baker, 485 US at 512-13.
166. Hodel, 452 US at 288; and FERC, 456 US at 764-65.
167. Dole, 483 US at 210-11.
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take-title provision of the LLRWPAA was predictable. 168 The
Court properly found that the challenged provisions of the
LLRWPAA were of the "directing or compelling states to legis-
late" line of cases because the LLRWPAA sought to influence
states to legislate with respect to disposal of low-level radioactive
waste according to Congress' scheme. Applying the rule implicit in
that line of cases, that Congress may not direct or compel states to
legislate, the Court correctly found that the take-title provision
was unconstitutional because it commandeered the states into the
service of the federal government either by being forced to take
title to radioactive waste, or regulating according to Congress'
direction.
The dissent, although compelling on its face, grounded its argu-
ment on the premise that the Court had never before recognized a
distinction between generally applicable laws and laws seeking to
direct states to legislate, and reasoned, therefore, that the Court
was incorrect in not applying the Garcia rule to this case. In
Baker, however, all three New York dissenters joined in the major-
ity opinion which not only expressly distinguished between gener-
ally applicable laws and laws seeking to direct states to legislate,
but also indicated that the rule of FERC survived the Garcia
decision."6 9
Also, application of the Garcia rule to instances where federal
law seeks to direct states to legislate, as Justice White would have
the Court do,170 would be unsound. Such a rule would allow Con-
gress to "commandeer" state legislatures and direct them to pass
whatever law Congress instructed them to pass so long as the state
was not excluded from the political process.1 71 As Justice O'Connor
argued, such methods of enacting state law would tend to lessen
168. Indeed, both Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist were already on record as predict-
ing the rebirth of a National League of Cities type principle which would again protect
state sovereignty from Congressional overreaching. Responding to the Court's rule in Gar-
cia, Justice Rehnquist stated: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell
out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command
the support of a majority of this Court." Garcia, 469 US at 580 (Rehnquist dissenting).
Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated: "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in
time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id at 589 (O'Connor dissenting).
169. Baker, 485 US at 513-14. Important to the Court's decision in Baker was that the
challenged Congressional act "[did] not, as did the statute in FERC, seek to control or influ-
ence the manner in which States regulate." Id at 514. See also notes 161, 162 and accompa-
nying text.
170. New York, 112 S Ct at 2443 (White concurring in part, dissenting in part).
171. Id at 2420 quoting Hodel, 452 US at 288. See notes 36, 37 and accompanying text.
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the accountability of elected representatives,' and would leave
citizens with the impression that state officials are not sensitive to
local needs. The New York rule will probably be found to be prac-
tical in future Tenth Amendment litigation since it requires a
court to determine only: (1) whether the challenged law seeks to
direct or influence states to legislate, and if so, (2) whether the law
actually directs, or is so coercive as to compel, the states to legis-
late in accordance with Congress' instructions. If the answer to
both prongs is yes, then the law is unconstitutional as being incon-
sistent with the Tenth Amendment. Otherwise, either the Garcia
rule applies, because the law is a generally applicable law, or the
law is constitutional, because it does not direct or compel states to
legislate. 7 '
Scott Gardner
172. See note 42 and accompanying text. From the viewpoint of a state citizen, it ap-
pears that the state legislature has proposed, debated and enacted state law, and therefore,
state representatives should be held accountable. Where Congress has directed a state to
legislate, however, the state legislature has merely, under duress, rubber stamped federal
policy. Thus, state representatives are held accountable without responsibility, while Con-
gress has authority without accountability. Id at 2424.
173. The Court's decision in New York also raises the question of the future of Garcia.
The district court deciding New York speculated that "it may well be this case which results
in Garcia being overturned." New York, 757 F Supp at 13. Nonetheless, on its face, New
York leaves Garcia intact since, as the Court noted, the challenged provisions of the
LLRWPAA did not involve generally applicable law, and therefore, did not present an occa-
sion to revisit the holding of the Garcia line of cases. New York, 112 S Ct at 2420. However,
Garcia, as some commentators have noted, is no less questionable than the precedent it
overruled. Berkovitz, Waste Wars, 11 Harv Envir L Rev at 470 (cited in note 123). The
meager judicial protection of state sovereignty provided for in Garcia was further dimin-
ished in Baker so that, today, Tenth Amendment protection is merely a procedural pre-
sumption that a generally applicable law is constitutional unless a state can show that it was
excluded from the political process. Indeed, it will be difficult for a state to show failure of
the political process because in neither Garcia nor Baker did the Court set forth what would
comprise a failure of the political process. Like leaving a child to mind a candy store, the
Court in Garcia put the responsibility of protecting the states from intrusion in their sover-
eignty by Congress in the hands of Congress itself. Given that the Garcia rule forecloses
judicial review in a critical area of Constitutional law, the conservative shift of the Court in
the past decade, and that the New York decision restored a principle of state sovereignty, it
is not unlikely that Garcia will become another pothole in the uncertain road traveled in
recent Tenth Amendment cases.
